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1 INTRODUCTION1
Development projects usually include several actors:
bilateral and multilateral development agencies,
the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
governments (including government agencies at
national and local levels), and the recipients. The
effectiveness of a project depends upon the coop-
eration of all these actors. If we assume that (a)
motivation, based on incentives, determines per-
formance in organizations, that (b) different kinds
of organizations use different incentive structures,
and that (c) ineffectiveness is the result of the
failure to relate incentive to performance on a fair
yet compulsory basis, then we need to clearly un-
derstand the differences in the incentives of IGOs,
NGOs, and recipient governments. In each sector,
the actors are both rewarded and hence motivated
differently. In addition, in each sector incentives are
linked to different sanctions. For example, in the
public sector the state expects public officials to be
motivated by vocation and thus carry out orders.
In exchange, it guarantees incomes, recognizes pro-
fessional autonomy and creates internal accounting
systems, while forcing the minister to account to
citizens at elections.
The enforcement of sanctions requires accountabil-
ity: service providers have to be motivated to de-
liver the desired type and level of performance. This
can be done by ensuring that the influence of the
concerned stakeholders is reflected in the monitor-
ing and incentive systems of service providers. If
we accept that accountability is essential and that
its 'effectiveness' will depend on whether effective
sanctions exist through which that accountability
can be enforced, then we need to know what con-
ditions limit as well as promote accountability,
in this case, gender accountability in different
agencies. I define gender accountability as respon-
siveness to women's interests and the incorporation
of gender-sensitive policies, programmes and
projects both in state institutions and in donor agen-
cies. What are the options open to stakeholders -
I would like to thank the participants of the IDS Workshop on
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in our case, beneficiaries, donors, members, and
governments? As an example, Hirschman's (1970)
concepts of 'exit' and 'voice' can provide useful
tools in evaluating options.2
NGOs (international or domestic) and government
agencies obtain resources (development assistance)
from the state and from multilateral or bilateral
donor agencies and provide services in exchange,
and as such they are involved in explicit or implicit
contracts in which their output must measure up in
some way to what they have received.
Accountability then becomes the mechanism
through which this relationship is regulated,
one between principals and agents in which the
former must create a system in which they can
obtain the information required to monitor per-
formance and create the incentives and sanc-
tions required to ensure that the agents meet
the obligations created through the receipt of
funds or support.
(Brett 1993: 278-79)
Most of the development literature considers ac-
countability solely as a political or an organiza-
tional issue. I will discuss accountability under
three categories: the organizational, political and
cognitive contexts, within which development pro-
grammes and projects are designed and imple-
mented. Accountability has to do with the organi-
zational characteristics (goals, procedures, staffing,
incentive systems) of all agencies involved, as well
as with the political context, i.e. the political com-
mitment of the stakeholders to a project, whether
the options of 'exit' and 'voice' are available, and
whether democratic accountability exists. Finally,
accountability cannot be discussed without under-
standing the 'discourse' underlying a particular
policy area, in our case, gender policy. How do
different stakeholders define 'gender issues'? On
what basis should resources be allocated to women?
What is perceived as the cause of gender constraints
2 The preceeding two paragraphs draw upon E.A. Brett's article
'Voluntary agencies as development organizations ... ',Develop-
ment and Change, Vol 24: 269-303 which I found very useful.
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will also determine what solutions are proposed.
To what extent is there agreement between different
stakeholders on the nature of the issue and the
proposed solutions? These are some of the ques-
tions we might ask as we explore gendered insti-
tutions. Therefore, I will begin by analysing the
conditions that limit and promote accountability3
within these three major categories: the organiza-
tional context, the political context, and the
cognitive context.
2 WHAT CONDITIONS AFFECT
RESPONSIVENESS TO GENDER POLICY?
2.1 The organizational context
A Conflicting objectives of stakeholders
The world of development assistance is populated
by a large number of actors: NGOs (both as donors
and beneficiaries), beneficiary populations, IGOs,
and host country governments. Since each of these
parties have differing and sometimes conflicting
interests and leverage, difficult problems of moni-
toring and enforcement arise. Each actor would
like to ensure effective performance, though their
needs and criteria as well as their sources of infor-
mation will differ. While the donors attempt to
ensure appropriate performance, the recipients will
wish to maximize their autonomy and resources.
Even when there is a seeming fit between project
objectives and broader recipient and donor goals,
effective performance cannot be guaranteed be-
cause such a fit does not reveal whether the project
is a priority for the recipient or not. If it is not
considered a priority (this means that the project
objective specifically fits into policy priorities of
recipient institutions and/or is supported by top
officials in relevant recipient institutions), the
project may serve implicit or unofficial priorities
instead of official ones. In the case of developing
country bureaucracies, securing autonomy - the
power of independent action - is a priority and
this can only be accomplished through the acquisi-
tion of resources. A high proportion of these re-
sources are expended in maintaining the organiza-
tion itself rather than in achieving specified
goals. A very common way to 'maintain oneself" in
developing countries is through patronage politics;
resources are secured to acquire and maintain
allies.
I will use 'responsiveness' and 'accountability' interchangeably
in this article.
12
In order to capture resources, bureaucracies may
accept unwanted projects. Once resources are se-
cured, there is a tendency to abandon implementa-
tion and turn to the competition for the next round
of resources on the part of high-level government
staff. This means incentives for effective perform-
ance are vastly reduced. In the case of projects for
women, governments may accept funds for such
projects but may not necessarily have the interest or
the will to implement them. We know that many
projects that incorporate women are externally
funded and it is not clear how sustainable they will
be in the long run. Unofficial priorities are not just
characteristics of recipient institutions; donor
agencies may also have implicit goals such as the
timely delivery of projects through the pipeline.
One example is the World Bank: as a bank, it is a
profit-making institution and therefore maximizing
the number of loans made in the shortest amount of
time possible may take priority. This emphasis on
feeding the project pipeline encourages front-end
planning, i.e. focusing on project design, prepara-
tion and appraisal rather than implementation and
evaluation. This situation further weakens incen-
tives for performance and its monitoring. As formal
and informal goals diverge, commitment may be
lost, communication problems may increase, and
central direction may weaken.
A World Bank vocational training project in Turkey
that ran into difficulties satisfying its objectives
illustrates some of these organizational issues
(Kardam 1992). The project objective, improving the
supply of well-trained labour for manufacturing
industries through vocational training, was in line
with the export-oriented development strategy of
the government, as well as the World Bank strategy
to incorporate developing countries into the world
market economy through increased exports. Yet
most of the instructors who went abroad to be
retrained (in areas of export business) returned to
their previous jobs. This situation is partly derived
from the lack of interest in the project by the Turkish
authorities. There is so far no comprehensive hu-
man resource development policy in Turkey that
establishes the links between education, employ-
ment, and certification. If vocational education was
a priority area for the Ministry of National Educa-
tion, perhaps broader policy reform that links
education and employment could be established.
Even though it is a declared goal, using education
to increase socioeconomic development is still
secondary to its service to promote citizenship and
national ideology. Vocational education in Turkey
has a definite secondary status, since universities
have been the avenue to respected, white-collar
jobs. This lack of interest was reflected in the low
level of involvement by high level bureaucrats in
this project. It also affects the lower echelons of
Turkish bureaucracy, who are not likely to devote
attention to a project if they do not get the appro-
priate signals from their superiors.
B Decentralization
The world of development assistance is highly
decentralized. As an example, the United Nations
consists of a myriad of agencies that may be in-
volved in the same project. Projects are imple-
mented by international or national NGOs. The
governments are further involved either as recipi-
ents of assistance, or in the case of the UN, as
contributors of funds to their own projects. In my
research on the UNDP's response to gender issues
(Kardam, 1992), I found that the decentralized na-
ture of the tripartite system (consisting of UNDP,
UN specialized agencies and member govern-
ments) contributed to slow response to the Nairobi
recommendations. Within this tripartite system,
the UNDP is required to give first consideration for
project execution to UN agencies with an appropri-
ate specialization. Donor governments have a voice
in UNDP affairs as contributors of funds, and
recipient governments have come to regard the
Indicative Planning Figures (IPFs) as firm commit-
ments to their countries. Furthermore, recipient
governments contribute funds to UN projects which
gives them voice in the process. This system may
lead to a lack of definition of responsibilities (with
commensurate authority) regarding project man-
agement. In the case of gender issues, I found
that this has led to 'passing the buck' and a disavow-
ing-of-responsibility syndrome. The decentralized
system has not been entirely unfavourable to
the consideration of gender issues, however. It has
at times allowed gender-sensitive UNDP staff to
play the role of 'instigator' by bringing donors and
recipient governments together to sponsor particu-
lar activities.
C Procedures of stakeholders, including finding
indicators for success
Procedures, broadly defined, include skills, know-
ledge, training of employees (including the ap-
proaches and strategies used) and decision making
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techniques (such as economic analysis, technical
analysis, or analysis based on social science tech-
niques). Particular procedures also provide staff
members with particular perspectives or 'world
views' on issues. A noteworthy point is that pro-
cedures of the donor and recipient both influence
the project process and shape the project team's
operations. Since gender policy formulation takes
place within institutions, it is of the utmost impor-
tance to pay attention to specific organizations'
goals and procedures in order to promote gender-
positive institutional change. Whether gender
policy is introduced in a way consistent with the
goals and procedures of an organization greatly
influences its response.
In my analysis of three development agencies, the
World Bank, the UNDP and the Ford Foundation,
I found that policy advocates took care to define
gender issues in accordance with each agency's
goals. For example, the World Bank's goals are to
increase its profitability as a financial institution,
and to promote economic growth for developing
countries (with reliance on the market mecha-
nism). To the extent that women in development
(WID) issues were presented and justified in a way
instrumental to these goals, they have been accept-
able. Ultimately, the consideration of WID issues
depends on the ability of its advocates to demon-
strate greater benefit to cost ratios in order to elicit
more resources. On the other hand, the Ford Foun-
dation's more extensive response to WID can be
explained by the greater correlation of WID with
the Foundation's goals and procedures. The Foun-
dation's goal to find innovative solutions to social
problems rests on a value system that emphasizes
equity and anti-discrimination. The root of social
problems is seen as stemming from the unequal
treatment and discrimination of some groups in
society. Given that the objective of WID advocates
is to enhance women's ability to contribute to and
benefit from development on an equal basis with
men, the relevance of gender issues is justified on
the basis of the Foundation's goals and values.
(Kardam 1991) The Ford Foundation's procedures
emphasize the search for and resolution of social
problems. In fact, staff members are primarily
social scientists with backgrounds in academia and
research organizations. Finding solutions to social
problems has meant support for the prdduction of
new knowledge. When the Foundation enters a new
area, it makes grants for basic research, applied
research, and action programmes, in that order.
This has proved to be an advantage in women's
programming because research by and on women
clearly helped to identify areas where action regard-
ing women's programming was needed.
Procedures that are control-oriented tend to hinder
flexibility and response to unforeseen circumstances,
qualities that are especially needed in new areas like
gender policy. Control-oriented procedures dis-
courage frequent consultations between the donor,
recipient and the project team, and may lead to
misunderstandings and resentments. Procedural
differences affect the project process even more if
the organizations involved operate in different
cultural and economic contexts, as they do in devel-
opment projects. Project teams are accountable to
several masters - that is, they have to work with at
least two different organizations with quite differ-
ent procedures. Even seemingly small procedural
differences, such as differences in payment of for-
eign consultants and their local counterparts may
create enough resentment to reduce motivation and
incentives for effective performance considerably.
Monitoring mechanisms also present problems.
Monitoring is especially costly where donors are
funding services in remote foreign areas about which
they have virtually no independent information.
Official aid agencies subject to public scrutiny and
accountability need to ensure that services are
properly performed. Formal evaluations carried
out by large donors are sometimes the most rigor-
ous processes to which NGO projects are subjected.
Yet these exercises are difficult in themselves as
evaluators have limited time, local situations are
very complex, and both field workers and benefi-
ciaries will have a vested interest in ensuring that
the service continues. They may therefore collude
to conceal failures from evaluators.
Perhaps the major problem in the public sector is
the difficulty involved in devising and enforcing
rational success indicators. In the case of gender
policy this is especially relevant, as there is disa-
greement on how it should be defined and imple-
mented.3 As Brett (1993: 280-81) points out:
As long as non-market agencies are used for
many purposes, we will have to make alloca-
tion decisions on the basis of imperfect success
I will discuss these issues in more detail in the section on the
'cognitive context'.
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indicators which involve calculations based on
subjective ideological judgments as much as on
objectively measurable quantities ... Where
objectives are in conflict - for example where
participatory processes reduce the output
derived from a given investment - the final
assessment must be based upon a sum of the
gains and the losses. This involves difficult
philosophical and practical problems evaded
in traditional economic analysis, butin real life
social choices are commonly made on the basis
of competing and incompatible objectives where
non-material values often take precedence over
material gains.
D Internal policy advocacy
For a new issue to gain acceptance, its consistency
or 'fit' with the organization's goals and procedures
is necessary, though not sufficient for acceptance.
A new issue which may be consistent with goals
and procedures but without advocates willing to
bargain on its behalf will not automatically be
incorporated. Without the conscious effort of some
people, sometimes called policy advocates or
policy entrepreneurs, policies may never be formui
lated or implemented (Kardam 1992). Polsby (1984)
suggests that policy innovations are initiated by
interest groups and persons who actively identify
new issues and who specialize in acquiring and
deploying knowledge about them. He calls these
people policy entrepreneurs who, by the skillful
mobilization of facts which serve as justification
for action and through the accurate identification
and thoughtful cultivation of allies (i.e. political
clout), bring a policy into being. By virtue of being
inside an agency, they also build in accountability
mechanisms by reviewing and revising policy
documents, providing input to policy documents,
attending high-level management meetings, sug-
gesting new policies to the management and inter-
viewing job candidates. Strategies to present facts as
a basis for action range from holding seminars,
writing background papers, inviting outside speak-
ers, holding staff meetings, and providing input
into programme development, to showing how a
new issue fits the goals and procedures of the or-
ganization. If agencies don't have gender policy
advocates working from within, then instigating
gender-positive institutional change will be rela-
tively more difficult.
2.2 The poIitica context
A Political commitment of stakeholders
If politics means, according to one well-known
definition, 'who gets what, when and how,' or the
distribution of power in terms of both resources
and influence, then the politics of international
agencies, as well the politics at both national and
local levels, will affect gender policy outcomes.
Given the time constraints and the competing
issues demanding attention from international
and national bureaucrats, the question becomes
'why should one pay attention to gender issues
at all?'
Lack of political commitment to a project hampers
effectiveness because sanctions are ineffective or
are not imposed, performance is not monitored and
incentives for performance are weakened. In the
development literature, the importance of political
commitment to a project by the recipient country is
emphasized (Grindle 1980). Obviously, developing
country élites' (this includes both the responsible
implementing agency and top government officials)
commitment to the project increases the chances of
success. If the project is not considered important,
implementation will suffer; bureaucrats who are
responsible will not give it priority. A discussion of
political commitment should not just focus on the
recipient side, however. Donor agencies are part of
the political context of projects as well. As Heaver
(1982: 39) puts it:
It cannot be stressed too strongly that it is a
non-issue to raise a question whether agencies
should be involved in the sort of recipient bu-
reaucratic activity .... It is a non-issue because
agencies have no choice: they are in the political
game ... If funding agencies choose to adopt a
do-nothing strategy, this is effectively a politi-
cal decision to accept the present position. If
agencies are serious about their official goals,
the question is ... not whether they play politics,
but how to be better at it than others.
Donor agencies may need to mobilize support
among the government agencies and various groups
in society in order to achieve project objectives.
Parker and Friedman (1993) point out:
In spite of the differing interests, all these or-
ganizations are linked not only through their
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shared goal of enabling development but also
because each entity needs the support of others
for its change process to have a positive impact.
For example, if an international US-based dev-
elopment organization makes a strategic change
in its primary goals in favour of directly address-
ing unequal gender power relations, it cannot
carry out this goal unless its donor organiza-
tions value and support such an approach.
B Sensitivity to external pressure
At the international level, the rise of the WID move-
ment pressured development agencies and govern-
ments to put gender issues on the agenda. The
United Nations recommendations resulting from
several conferences on gender issues, the establish-
ment of WID offices at many development agen-
cies, and the WID bureaus and units within many
governmental bureaucracies are the outcome of
these pressures. Most recently, at the international
Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo, gender issues were put on the agenda clearly
and centrally. The Programme of Action adopted
by delegations from 179 states includes a chapter
on 'Gender Equality, Equity and Empowerment
of Women':
This chapter calls on countries to empower
women and eliminate inequality between men
and women, eliminate all forms of discrimina-
tion against the girl child and the root causes of
son preference; increase public awareness of
the value of girl children, beyond their potential
for child bearing, and promote equal participa-
tion of women and men in all areas of family
and household responsibilities.
(Populi October 1994)
At the same time, movements are at a disadvantage
when it comes to institutionalization, including the
establishment of accountability mechanisms, be-
cause the issues need to be broadly formulated to
gain acceptance and because they generally are
instituted from the outside rather than from within.
Furthermore, development agencies' sensitivity to
external pressures differ. Those actors that are
relatively more independent would be less likely to
be influenced by external pressure than those that
are more dependent. The degree of independence
has to do with an international organization's (IO)
range of accountability to other actors. The narrower
International organizations include international governmental organizations for the purpose of this article.
organizations, as well as international non-governmental
the circle of accountability, the more independent
an 10 would be. For example, international non-
governmental organizations in the field of interna-
tional development, such as the Ford Foundation,
seem to be relatively more independent because
their circle of accountability is very narrow: they
are directly accountable only to a board of direc-
tors. The World Bank, however, a specialized UN
agency, is probably not as independent as the Ford
Foundation in its policies, but nevertheless more
so than most United Nations agencies. The World
Bank has a weighted voting system and is therefore
accountable to those member states who provide
the highest capital subscription. Many UN agen-
cies, on the other hand, are much less independent,
because their circle of accountability is quite wide:
they are accountable to all member countries since
the decision making process is based on a one-
member, one-vote system. They are thus much
more permeable and open to influence by all mem-
ber governments, as well as by NGOs. Naturally,
external influence, such as that exercised by the
international women's movement, would have a
different impact on different lOs, depending on
their relative independence within the interna-
tional development assistance regime. It is not
necessarily the case, however, that more account-
ability is accompanied by increased effectiveness.
Too much public voice can bring service delivery
to a halt; excessive accountability may diminish
effectiveness considerably. In fact, both the US
Agency for International Development and the US
State Department have been pointed out as organiza-
tions where accountability to diverse interests has
reduced their effectiveness.
Even when international development agencies
have become to responsive to gender issues, there
is no guarantee that they can, in general, elicit
compliance from recipient governments. We know
that the issue of how to promote compliance for
international norms and rules is a problem for all
international regimes. According to Oran Young
(1989), the lack of well-entrenched and properly-
financed supranational institutions in interna-
tional society ensures that international regimes
must rely heavily on the ability and willingness
of individual members to elicit compliance with
key provisions within their own jurisdictions. I
have argued elsewhere, drawing from a case
study on Turkey (Kardam 1994), that international
norms and rules may be very influential in prompt-
ing policy changes in a particular country, but
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whether these policy changes are more than words
on paper depends on relationships between state
and society. It is important to note that to propose
that states make changes regarding women's roles
and status creates deeper problems than just those
of verification and policing. Issue areas which pro-
pose changes in the relationship between the na-
tional state and its subjects are especially sensitive,
for as Krasner (1985:118) points out, prevailing in-
ternational norms and practices place few inhibi-
tions on a state's discretionary control over its own
subjects. Yet, support for women's movements from
outside is crucial for the survival of many national
machineries for women that were established in
response to the UN Conference in Nairobi in 1985.
Alvarez (1990) points out that, in the past, inter-
national feminist solidarity successfully brought
pressure to bear on the international development
establishment, indirectly pushing Third World
states to open up some political space, however
minimal, for the articulation of progressive gender
discourses and policies.
C State-society relationships
States possess political institutions. These tradition-
ally include constitutions, institutions of power
such as legislatures, executives and judiciaries, and
a means of promoting political views, often seen in
the form of elections. Even though most of these
elements are present in Western democracies as
well as authoritarian regimes, in non-democratic
settings questions may arise regarding the extent
to which these institutions are held accountable.
Third World states struggle to achieve certain goals:
'The central political and social drama of recent
history has been the battle pitting the state and
organizations allied with it (often from a particular
social class) against other social organizations dot-
ting society's landscape.' (Migdal 1988: 27) Within
this context, those who make the rules acquire
social control. In relatively new states, rules of the
game are not necessarily agreed upon. State élites
try to penetrate society, regulate social relation-
ships, and extract resources with varying degrees
of success. For example, the seemingly inconse-
quential conflict in Mustafa Kemal's Turkey over
what kind of hat men should wear was, in fact,
about who had the right and ability (religious élites
or bureaucratic élites) to make rules.
The question of accountability becomes very impor-
tant when introducing the term 'civil society' to the
discussion of the state. If we define civil society as
those institutions and groups below the state level
that can challenge the state itself on certain issues,
then the type of state must be considered. Presum-
ably, a state that permits such groups to exist and
advocate opinions in an unfettered manner can be
classified as a democracy, or at least possessing
democratic values. Authoritarian regimes, in con-
trast, would not likely allow such groups to exist
at all, or only under strict control. The relationship
between the state and civil society becomes par-
ticularly important when speaking of a system in
transition, or a transition to democracy. Not only
must one consider the institutional developments,
but the existence of, or potential for, a civil society.
For the latter to exist, the state must be receptive
to possible sources of opposition, and allow its
population to actively participate. There must be a
political culture conducive to political action.
Accountability of state institutions for gender
policy seem to increase to the extent that regimes
are democratic and to the extent that there are
women's organizations within civil society who
demand it. For example, Alvarez argues that in
transitional regimes, gender-specific demands may
stand a greater chance of being met if women's
mobilization is seen as necessary to consolidate the
regime, solidify its legitimacy and achieve larger
developmental goals (Alvarez:1990: 270).
D The uneven power between beneficiaries and
agencies
The beneficiaries of many development projects,
especially where women are involved, are typi-
cally poor, ill-educated and vulnerable, with limi-
ted access to information. But accountability in
development projects is not generally directed
towards the beneficiaries, but rather towards the
donors. As Brett (1993: 292-93) points out:
in deprived environments, for example in
Africa, neither exit nor voice are realistic op-
tions for the poor. Some NGOs try to 'empower'
beneficiaries through participatory structures
which encourage local communities to identify
priorities, develop programmes ... These are
commendable efforts, but they are time-con-
suming and depend on the goodwill of the
agency. They do not give consumers any inde-
pendent authority over the agency; only donors
enforcing a budget can exercise such authority,
so that in terms of evaluation, donors have to
be seen as surrogates for consumers.
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Brett goes on to suggest that local NGOs, once they
have access to external sources, acquire a privileged
position in the local community while potential
beneficiaries may not know what their entitle-
ments should be. Donors are unable to get reliable
information about the groups, and accountability
is greatly reduced, especially in poor communities
dominated by patron-client networks.
Professional technicians and government bureau-
crats are not rewarded for being responsive to local
conditions nor contributing toward the develop-
ment of local institutional capacities. Accountabil-
ity is directed at actors different than the clients,
which reduces the incentive to be responsive to
client interests substantially. As Korten puts it
(1980: 484)
The fact is that USAID is accountable to the US
Congress and to agencies such as the Office of
Management and Budget. Not surprisingly, the
USAID programmer is more likely to be pre-
occupied with the needs and involvement of the
groups that arbitrate his programme than with
those of the poor beneficiaries.
Governments may be more easily adaptable to
local problem-solving but may lack the political will
to do so. To what extent would governments be
interested in involving women beneficiaries in
programmes and projects? It is clear that new
participation changes the nature of the influence
structure. Participation is inescapably political.
Broader participation by women is likely to change
the use and allocation of resources in society -
indeed, that is why it is often advocated.
2.3 Cognitive context - the discourse of
gender issues
In order to promote any new policy, a gap between
reality and the desired state has to be seen. Further-
more, reasons for the existence of such a gap need
to be elaborated upon, so that based on these rea-
sons, one can devise ways to overcome them. There
is a wide diversity of views regarding why there is
a gap between what exists and what the ideal state
of gender issues in development should be, as
well as how this gap should be overcome. (See
Goetz in Grant and Newland (eds) 1991; Jaquette
in Tinker (ed.) 1990 and Kardam 1987).
Gender and Development combines two broad
theoretical issues: women's social, economic and
political roles in society, and the nature of develop-
ment itself. As is well known, international devel-
opment agencies, governments, and NGOs differ on
the definitions of both these issues. The interna-
tional WID (Women in Development) movement
itself has not been able to reach an agreement on
any norms, mostly because the definitions had to
remain broad and ambiguous in order to elicit co-
operation from different actors. Looking briefly at
gender relations, most would agree that the power
relations between men and women are unequal
and what women do is generally undervalued. The
'superior' party in an unequal relationship presum-
ably has more of some ability or valuable quality.
While these abilities vary with the particular rela-
tionship, they include emotional maturity, experi-
ence in the world, physical skills, and a body of
knowledge or techniques for acquiring certain kinds
of knowledge. Dominant actors usually define
acceptable roles for subordinates. 1f gender rela-
tions are based on unequal power, then it is crucial
to uncover how women's roles in society have been
defined by men. We know that these are socially
constructed roles and change depending on differ-
ent societies, cultures and time. But definitions of
women's roles typically involve providing services
that men don't want to perform. The functions that
men perform, on the other hand, tend to be guarded
carefully and relatively closed to women (Miller
1976). According to Miller, a dominant group
inevitably has the greatest influence in determining
a cultures' overall outlook, its philosophy, moral-
ity, social theory, and even its science. The domi-
nant group thus legitimizes the unequal relation-
ship and incorporates it into society's guiding
concepts. Thus a power relationship is legitimized
and disguised as the 'normal', 'natural', and 'ex-
pected' way things should be. In the same way,
gender relations become legitimized and are incor-
porated into organizational and state ideologies.
Turning to the discourse on gender, a major 'guid-
ing concept' helping to legitimize the unequal rela-
tionship between men and women is the 'public!
private' distinction. Men, as the dominant group,
have defined women's work as housework and
child rearing and relegated it to the 'private' sphere,
while maintaining control over the 'public' sphere
of political power, law, and general public life (see,
e.g. Ehlstain 1974). This distinction has been part
of Western history since the Greeks. Capitalism and
liberal theories of the state encouraged early West-
ern feminist movements; however, women still
remained within the confines of male-defined
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institutions. Liberalism meant equal opportunity
for everyone; in other words, women could now
compete with men on the basis of their capacity for
reason. But at the same time, patriarchal institu-
tions continued defining women as less capable of
reason than men and as limited to the 'private
sphere'.
These two concepts 'equal opportunity for all' and
the 'public/private distinction' that maintained in-
equality between men and women could go hand
in hand because 'equal opportunity' meant that
women were given the opportunity to compete with
men in male-defined institutions. Still, the abilities
that are defined as valuable, such as the ability to
reason or the ability to compete in the public realm,
are defined by and reserved for men. Because such
characteristics are defined as male characteristics,
it can be deemed unsuitable, unseemly or simply
impossible for women to acquire them. Women, by
accepting this discourse on gender, inadvertently
accept the arguments of their 'sexual inferiority'.
The definitions of what women can and cannot do
then become self-reinforcing, because women's
knowledge of themselves is defined within the
dominant discourses and therefore is not a realistic
evaluation of their own capacities and problems.
There are women who have internalized these
dominant beliefs of gender roles who think that
they are less important, less valuable, or less smart
than men. This, of course, makes them more hesi-
tant to venture into the public realm of international
donor agencies, or state bureaucracies and demand
accountability.
An example of gender discourses are reflected in
government bureaucracies comes from Malawi.
David Hirchman's interviews with Malawian bu-
reaucrats reveals the denigration, compartment-
alization, and trivialization of matters dealing
with women's work. According to a senior official
he interviewed (in Staudt 1986: 29):
Men's superiority here is customary - also it is
Christian ... it is in the Bible. We expect our
wives to respect us and despite talk of equality,
we must lead ... we can compromise a bit, but
we must lead. Women were meant to serve
men; they can never be equal to men.
It is important to understand how gender relations
are defined in specific contexts and what the per-
ceived sources of inequality are. Depending ort
how the sources of gender inequality are defined,
policy recommendations differ. If, for example,
the reasons are seen as the infiltration of Western
norms that undermine the traditional roles and the
accompanying respect for women, then policy
recommendations that follow would certainly not
include exposing more women to the 'public sphere'
and to competition with men. Instead they would
include ways to maintain the 'equal but separate'
status of women. This, for example, is how religious
conservatives in Turkey generally view gender rela-
tions. If the reasons for unequal gender relations
are seen as caused by exploitative economic rela-
tions as socialist feminists view them, then policy
recommendations would include treatment of
women from different socioeconomic backgrounds
differently and devise different policies, for exam-
ple, for urban middle class women, urban factory
workers, domestic servants and peasant women in
rural areas. On the other hand, if the crux of the
issue is seen as the lack of opportunity for women
within male-defined institutions, then policies are
targeted to establishing space for women, and
rewriting laws to promote women's interests.
The discourse on development, like the discourse
on gender relations, also presents a vast and colour-
ful array of definitions and policies that flow from
these definitions. Since the issue is not gender
issues per se, but gender and development, gender
policy and practice have been interpreted, analysed
and justified differently, depending on the dis-
course on development. When efficiency and eco-
nomic growth are emphasized, the economic con-
tributions of women to development are brought
on the agenda. Policy recommendations then in-
clude ways to improve their contribution to na-
tional development through programmes and
projects in training, education and employment
for women. It is suggested that patriarchal norms,
principles and institutions be dismantled to the
extent that they interfere with women's contribu-
tions to economic growth. When equity, basic
human needs and welfare issues dominate the dis-
course, the discussion turns to women in poverty
and lacking in basic human needs. Recommended
programmes and projects for women within this
discourse include increasing literacy, providing
loans for small-scale enterprises for women, pro-
viding upgraded technology to reduce hours of
work and the like. More recently, with the intro-
duction or the term empowerment into develop-
ment, women's empowerment has become a topic
of discussion. Policy recommendations that flow
from this discourse are broader than the first two.
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Women's empowerment now includes achieving
control over one's life through expanded choices.
The policy recommendations that would flow from
this view deal with ways of resolving conflicts
between women's productive and reproductive
roles, e.g. child care, and men's shares in the main-
tenance of the family, as well as women's participa-
tion overall in the redefinition of gender relations
and the meaning of development itself.
All policy is focused on the allocation of resources.
How is allocation of resources to women viewed?
Depending on whether the basis of such allocation
is equality, merit or need would determine the
institutions one targets for change Uaquette 1990).
Those that argue for equality would focus on legal
institutions, while those that argue for a market
allocation for resources would focus on how women
could elicit more responsiveness from market
institutions. If allocation to women is argued for
on the basis of need, then welfare bureaucracies
constitute the target. Therefore, it is very important
to analyse the gender discourse in specific contexts
so that it is clear from which institutions one
demands responsiveness.
3 STRATEGIES FOR GENDER-POSITIVE
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
3.1 The exercIse of leadership and the
formation of alliances
Effective leadership is necessary to move any issue
forward. In the case Of gender issues, Northern
European donors have taken the lead and encour-
aged other donors to consider gender issues. Initia-
tives have also come from NGOs both in the North
and South. WID entrepreneurs within agencies can
request the assistance of gender-sensitive allies
both in their agencies and outside. For example, a
case study on the World Bank's experience in in-
corporation of sociological issues demonstrated the
necessity of both external pressure and internal
advocacy (Kardam 1993). The case study focuses
on internal advocacy efforts in the World Bank by
a group of staff members to incorporate sociologi-
cal issues, especially in the area of involuntary
resettlement, and tribal population rights. While
external pressure played a large role in putting
pressure on the World Bank, the insiders were the
ones who introduced the issues in ways that fit
the goals and procedures of the World Bank in an
otherwise resistant environment, and forged links
with outside allies. This contributed to new policy
guidelines, to the hiring of more staff with social
science training, and, in general, to the increased
legitimacy of these issues in the World Bank.
Leadership is a matter of entrepreneurship; it in-
volves a combination of imagination in inventing
institutional options and skill in brokering the in-
terests of numerous actors to line up support for
such options. Expanding accountability will re-
quire a new coalition of gender-sensitive donor
agencies, development practitioners in donor and
recipient countries, as well as governments and
NGOs. Women's' NGOs need to become more
sophisticated in understanding how institutions
work and how to promote change within them. For
example, environmental NGOs have been relatively
more successful in pressuring the World Bank for
policy changes than women's NGOs (Siddharth
1994). Alliances between Southern and Northern
NGOs for women's interests is also crucial. Alli-
ances with powerful groups such as the police for
women's groups have also proved beneficial; as
Stewart (1994) points out, the effectiveness of
Musasa, a NGO in Zimbabwe working on domestic
violence was enhanced as a result of its constructive
relationship with the Zimbabwe Republic Police.
Alliances between NGOs and women's groups is
another option. Korten argues that (1990: 200):
Those VOs [voluntary organizations] with
women in development programmes are com-
ing to appreciate the full potential of women as
a development force and the extent to which
their liberation may be a key to unlocking cul-
tural constraints to needed economic and politi-
cal change. This creates the natural basis for
alliances with organizations engaged in the
women's movement.
In addition, international commissions can be set
up to monitor compliance; a basis for this exists in
the series of international covenants on women's
issues, managed by the UN Commission on Human
Rights. This organization can be brought more
centrally into WID compliance.
3.2 Improved communication between
women's NGOs and groups and state
institutions
Further democratization of societies will play a
large role in eliciting responsiveness from gov-
ernments. In this process, women's groups can
play a very important role in promoting the
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strength of civil society and improving communi-
cations between themselves and the government.
Unfortunately, in many authoritarian systems,
states have been reluctant to allow voice to groups
within society, and such groups have shunned
government initiatives due to fears of cooptation.
The strengthening of civil society should lead to
improved voice for women. Improved voice comes
with empowerment. Uphoff and Esman point out
that locally responsive organizations are facilitated
by, and may indeed depend upon, relative equity in
the ownership and control of land, since this re-.
duces the risk that they will be captured by estab-
lished élites. Likewise, there is danger in including
in the same organization groups with inherently
conflicting social and economic interests, such as
incompatible ethnic groups or landowners and
landless workers. In other words, the interest of
certain groups in society may impede rural devel-
opment efforts that involve the poor, including
women. This is more the case in a highly stratified
society.
33 Higher level of education for women
A higher level of education for women will clearly
increase women's empowerment and their 'voice'
both within society and within institutions. Women
who are educated not only have fewer children but
are also more aware of the options available to
them. This would lead to increased representation
of women in state institutions. Clearly, decisions
emerging from state institutions would more nearly
approximate the wishes of women if the staff of
these institutions reflect the demographic charac-
teristics of the general population.
3.4 Commitment to a transformational
development
in order to achieve accountability for gender policy,
ultimately, the definition of development needs to
change. Thus, besides practical strategies, a re-
definition of the development discourse and its
acceptance into mainstream development policy is
required for long-term change. Such a discourse
would start with 'people-centered development'.
As Karten (1990: 67) has defined it, development is
a process by which the members of a society increase
their personal and institutional capacities to mobi-
lize and manage resources to produce sustainable
and justly distributed improvements in their qual-
ity of life consistent with their own aspirations.
Increased accountability will partly come from the
political consciousness of women and the practical
strategies that they use to demand it, but that is only
half the story. Increased accountability is also a
function of the values of the power holder. Is there
such a thing as the responsible use of power; and
if so, how can it be attained? If egotism and greed
are deeply embedded in human nature, the human
spirit needs to be strengthened so that power is
redefined in 'positive-sum' terms rather than zero-
sum. As Korten (1990: 168) suggests, 'this new
consciousness must view power not as a club to be
used in the service of personal aggrandizement,
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